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FOUR LAND USE VIGNETTES FROM
UNZONED(?) HOUSTON
JOHN MIXON*
I. HOUSTON'S FREE ENTERPRISE IMAGE IS OVERBLOWN
Houston has been called "the hair shirt of the city planners."1 The
profession's discomfort stems from the city's repeated rejection of land
use zoning-the essential tool of their craft.2 The unrepentant city touts
itself as a model of enlightened differentness: a public-private combina-
tion that provides a better formula for managing growth in a modern
city. But beneath that Chamber of Commerce gloss,3 Houston's land use
is a far cry from free enterprise in action.
What this article calls "The Houston Way" combines: (1) An ada-
mant refusal to use government power prospectively to guide growth and
protect existing investment; with (2) A willingness to respond to specific
developer-citizen conflicts with ad hoc solutions that assign the City
Planning Commission a unique role in mediating the constant battle
between homeowners and developers. Rejection of traditional land use
solutions oftentimes places the city at the borderline between legal and
not-so-legal regulation.
A. Real Estate Developers Use City Power as an
Extension of Their Private Enterprise
From the day a couple of 1830s hucksters named their promotional
development after the hero of Texas independence, 4 Houston has catered
to real estate promoters who assumed their own financial interests unerr-
ingly reflected the public good. The self-appointed power elite got an
early grip on local government, and their successors still use it to advance
* John Mixon, Law Alumni Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center,
and author of TEXAS MUNICIPAL ZONING LAW (1985).
1. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 25 (1966).
2. Houston has rejected traditional land use zoning on three separate occasions by
referendum-1948, 1962, and 1993. Teddy M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in Houston
Contradicts the City's Free Market Reputation, 34 ENVTL. L. REp. 10045, 10057 (2004).
3. The Chamber is known locally as the Greater Houston Partnership. See Greater
Houston Partnership, http://www.houston.org/greater-houston-partnership (last visited
May 25, 2010).
4. JOE R. FEAGIN, FREE ENTERPRISE CITY: HOUSTON IN POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 48 (1988) ("Houston began in the 1830s as a speculative real estate venture
by two northern capitalists, J. K. Allen and A. C. Allen, in a swampy Gulf Coast area.").
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what they (perhaps honestly) believe is best for the city.5 Real estate
influence affects citizen voters as well as city hall, as mid-range land
developers and entrepreneurs have convinced the public to defeat zoning
in three referenda.6 However, the margin of defeat diminished with each
referendum, indicating The Houston Way might be at risk if traditional
zoning is reconsidered in the twenty-first century.7
Whether Houston's lack of zoning has had good or bad effects has
been debated. Neoclassical economists tend to bask in the city's success;
critics question whether the lack of zoning makes any difference, and
assert that the city's abandonment of traditional controls has irrevocably
damaged the city's residential neighborhoods.8 This article describes the
city's hypocritical responses as it tries to satisfy homeowners without
threatening developers' political power to veto traditional zoning.
B. Lack of Zoning Has Not Produced a Better City
The Houston Way has not produced a consumer-driven market-
place filled with better housing and glistening commercial uses. Instead,
the alliance between private interests and public power has committed
the city to conventional twentieth-century assumptions that low density
is good, industry and growth are worth all their external costs, 9 and auto-
5. Id. at 109. The 2009 mayoral race produced no candidate who supports zon-
ing. See infra Part II.G.
6. The last two referenda on zoning have been heavily influenced by interests that
poured money and advertising strategically into minority communities to defeat zoning.
See Kapur, supra note 2, at 10058, 10060-61. Several of the city's most prominent
developers and community leaders did not join the opposition. See id. at 10061 ("A
letter released in early 1993 reflects the support for zoning among some prominent lead-
ers. Developer Gerald Hines, former U. S. Energy Secretary and Chairman of Rice Uni-
versity's Board of Governors Charles Duncan, oilman Jack Blanton, Vinson & Elkins
former Managing Partner Harry Reasoner, and President of Friendswood Development
Company John Walsh all signed the endorsement letter.").
7. See Kapur, supra note 2 at 10057 ("Voters in Houston rejected the first pro-
posed zoning ordinance in 1948 by a margin of greater than two to one."); id. at 182 ("In
1962, the proposed ordinance failed by a slimmer 57% to 43% margin."); id. at 10059
("Houston voters rejected zoning for a third time in 1993, by a margin of 51.9% to 48.1
%."1).
8. R. A. Dyer, Zoning Defeated By Narrow Margin, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov.
3, 1993, at Al ("City Councilman Jim Greenwood, architect of the proposed ordinance,
conceded defeat at about 10:45 p.m. 'It looks like neighborhoods are going to lose
tonight-but the neighborhoods are not going to die tonight,' he said.") As a zoning
advocate, I made over 100 public speeches supporting the failed ordinance, pointing out
numerous inappropriate adjacencies, including a chicken packing plant across the street
from my mother's house in an unzoned residential neighborhood.
9. See NASA, Getting the Big Picture on Houston's Air Pollution, http://www.
nasa.gov/vision/earth/everydaylife/archives/HP ILPFeature 03.html (last visited May
25, 2010) ("Houston has a serious air quality problem. Since 1999, the Texas city has
exchanged titles with Los Angeles as having the most polluted air in the United States
defined by the number of days each city violates federal smog standards.").
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mobiles are better than mass transit for moving people. Not incidentally,
these policies further the interests of subdivision developers and builders,
whose outlying developments are favored by and dependent on outward
sprawl.
C. Overregulation, Not Under-Regulation,
Plagues Free Enterprise City
At the same time, Michael Lewyn challenges Houston's image of
minimal regulation, blaming overregulation-not under-regulation-for
a variety of land use ailments."l The government's stubborn requirement
of minimum lot sizes" contributes to costly and inefficient sprawl,
12
with consequent air pollution13 and traffic congestion.14 The expanding
ring of freeways ensures that new subdivisions will extend urban sprawl
ever outward-a growth pattern that is life's blood for single-family sub-
division developers.
D. Ad Hoc Regulations Resemble Traditional Zoning
Even Houston's disdain for zoning is more facade than fact.
Although rejecting traditional enabling act procedures, the city provides a
variety of complex, de facto zoning-type regulations. A hallmark of zon-
ing is drawing district lines and adopting regulations that vary from dis-
trict to district. 5
10. Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City Without
Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REv. 1171, 1200-01 (2004) ("Houston's setback requirements
and minimum parking requirements force pedestrians to walk through seas of parking in
order to reach apartments, shops, and jobs. Minimum parking requirements force land-
owners to build parking lots, and setback rules encourage businesses to place those park-
ing lots in front of buildings by preventing landowners from placing buildings in the
twenty-five feet in front of those buildings. Such regulations have combined to make
Houston more automobile-dependent-by reducing density, subsidizing driving, and
making pedestrian travel uncomfortable.").
11. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-182 (1999) sets a beginning
standard of 5000 feet minimum lot size for suburban areas, and HOUSTON, TEx., CODE
OF ORDINANCES § 42-183 (1999 & 2007) sets a beginning standard of ,500 feet for
urban areas. Lots with compensating open space may be reduced to 1400 square feet.
See Id.
12. Lewyn, supra note 10, at 1176.
13. d. at 1196 ("Houston's air is more polluted than that of all but a few Ameri-
can cities, at least partially because of heavy automobile use."). See NASA, supra note 9.
14. Lewyn, supra note 10, at 1177, 1200 ("Houston's anti-density rules may have
increased congestion by increasing driving: residents of low-density communities gener-
ally must drive more than other Americans, and Houstonians in particular drive more
miles daily than residents of more densely populated regions. So, by increasing driving,
Houston's minimum lot size requirements may have actually increased congestion." (cita-
tions omitted)).
15. For an example of a zoning enabling law, see the Texas Land Use Regulations
Districts, Tux. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.005 (Vernon 2008), stating: "(a) The
governing body of a municipality may divide the municipality into districts of a number,
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1. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act Declares: "(a) The governing
body . . . may divide the municipality into districts ....
(b) Zoning regulations must be uniform for each
class or kind of building in a district, but
the regulations may vary from district to district"' 6
Early zoning cases assumed that district-specific regulations required
a carefully thought-out plan, followed by rational implementation, to
survive constitutional scrutiny.17 That assumption ordinarily translates
into following the Standard Zoning Enabling Act to produce a rational
pattern of land use districts and regulations "in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan."' 8 The enabling act tracks the constitutional require-
ment that to be valid, government action must be rational and
substantially advance a conceivable public purpose.' 9 Texas' Home Rule
shape, and size the governing body considers best for carrying out this subchapter.
Within each district, the governing body may regulate the erection, construction, recon-
struction, alternation, repair, or use of buildings, other structures, or land. (b) Zoning
regulations must be uniform for each class or kind of building in a district, but the
regulations may vary from district to district." HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§ 33-4 (1991) defines "zoning" to mean "a system of land use regulation including, but
not limited to, the designation of specific parcels or areas of land where the use, or the
performance or development standards affecting such use, are or may be prescribed to
achieve the goals of an approved comprehensive plan for the unique circumstances of the
city." By its own definition, when Houston divides itself into specific areas or parcels of
land where performance or development standards are prescribed, it engages in "zoning."
16. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.005 (Vernon 2008). See ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ZONING, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT: UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS
§ 2 (1926) [hereinafter STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT].
17. See, e.g., Longley v. Rumsey, 224 N.Y.S. 165, 166-67 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ("The
ordinance in question does not divide the village into geographical subdivisions, but, in
lieu thereof, attempts to establish, as a separate district in itself, each village block; that is,
two sides of one street between the nearest intersections. Whether or not each of those
districts is residential or otherwise depends, not upon the decision of the trustees, but
upon the number of residences and vacant lots found within that so-called district....
Because of the failure of this ordinance to deal with the matter in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, and because of the arbitrary method by which the character of the
so-called districts is determined, it follows that this ordinance is not a valid restriction
upon the use of the premises .... ").
18. STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 16, at § 2. TEx. Loc. Gov'T
CODE ANN. §§ 211.006-211.007 (Vernon 2008) (detailing the required procedures).
19. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) ("[It must be
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare."); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
(1987) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) ("We have long recognized
that land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."');
Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1934) ("The ordinance before the
court in the Spann Case was fatally defective for various reasons. That case, however, did
not involve a comprehensive zoning plan adopted in accordance with and in compliance
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Cities, as well as general law municipalities, are required to follow ena-
bling act procedures if they choose to employ zoning regulations.
2
1
Presumably, if Houston were to designate land use districts and
impose zoning-type regulations without following the enabling act's pro-
cedures, its action would not be authorized under state law, and might
even be unconstitutional as arbitrary and unrelated to a legitimate public
purpose.
2. Like Zoning, Houston Regulations Vary from District to District
Houston routinely establishes regulations that differ from district to
district without following enabling act procedures. 21 For example, plan-
ning and platting ordinances prescribe different minimum lot sizes in the
central business district, "urban" areas, and "suburban" areas. 22 Regula-
tions in "Green Corridors ' ' 23 and within designated historic districts24
with statutory authority, and we do not regard it as an authority against the integrity of
the statute and ordinance before us.").
20. Peters v. Gough, 86 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ("In this connec-
tion . . . it is appellants' contention that the authority to enact zoning ordinances was
granted to cities operating under the home-rule amendment by the provisions of Revised
Statutes, art. 1175, subd. 26, and since that act does not contain any express limitation
on the manner in which the right is to be exercised, said city was left free to exercise the
right so conferred in any manner satisfactory to its legislative body. We are of the opin-
ion, however, that the act of 1927 above referred to is a general law and was intended to
be applicable to cities operating under the home-rule amendment, and since it was
enacted subsequent to the adoption of Revised Statutes, art. 1175, the powers granted
under said article 1175 must be exercised in conformity with the provisions of the latter
act.").
21. See Kapur, supra note 2, at 10057. See also HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF OLDI-
NANCES § 33-4 (1991), supra note 15, for Houston's definition of zoning as including
district designations.
22. HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-150 (1999 & 2009) sets dif-
ferent building lines, depending on whether construction lies in urban, suburban, or
central business district. For examples of de facto division of the city into separate dis-
tricts without following traditional zoning requirements, see HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 42-123 (1999 & 2001) (setting forth the boundaries of Houston's cen-
tral business district); HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-101 (1999) (setting
forth the requirements for designation as an "urban area"). See also City of Houston,
Minimum Lot Size and Minimum Building Line Ord., http://www.houstontx.govlplan-
ning/DevelopmentRegs/prevailLotBldg.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
23. HOUSTON, Tx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-104 (2003).
24. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-201-204 (1995, 2002, 2005
& 2007). The procedures for designating historic districts are detailed in HOUSTON,
TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-225 (1995, 2005 & 2006), and include city council
designation. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-236 (1995, 1998, 2002,
2004, & 2005) prohibits certain actions in historic districts without a "certificate of
appropriateness." HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-242 (1995) requires
new construction in a historic district to satisfy design criteria appropriate for the district.
HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-247 (1995 & 2005) regulates demolition.
HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-275 (2007) designates a specific historic
district and establishes rules for it.
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differ from those that apply outside the districts. Front yard parking
prohibitions apply only in designated districts.25 Proposed rules for
transit corridors would apply only along metro rail lines.26 Creating land
use districts with regulations that vary from district to district amounts to
zoning, and Houston's districting does not follow the enabling act's
requirements.
3. A Pretense of Performance Standards Conceals De Facto Land Use
Zoning
Houston skirts the different treatment objection by enacting ordi-
nances that, in theory, apply citywide, but are brought to bear on specific
areas by "performance standards" implemented through the Planning
Commission's plat approval power. 27 Although these devices have some
claim to legitimacy, the regulatory process would clearly be illegal if
tested by the standard of review applied to traditional zoning.28
4. "Zoning regulations must be adopted in accordance with a
comprehensive plan . . .29
Houston's regulations are not keyed to comprehensive planning as
envisioned and required by zoning. The Planning Commission prepares
elaborate plans for other purposes, but they do not drive Houston's dis-
trict-specific regulations. The city has a practice of delegating power to
private lot owners to initiate regulations to prevent their neighbors'
unwanted, but otherwise legal, land use. To the extent this amounts to a
delegation of legislative authority that advances private, not public, inter-
25. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-303 prohibits yard parking
only in districts designated by specific area ordinance.
26. HOUSTON LEGAL DEPARTMENT, INTERNAL DISCUSSION DRAFT JULY 15,
2009 (2009), available at http:t/www.houstontx.gov/planning/Urban/ProposedTransit
CorridorOrdinance.pdf (discussing potential amendment regarding transit corridors that
impose restrictions and requirements that apply only within the defined areas).
27. See, e.g., infra Part 1I1.A (discussing re-plat requirements and procedures).
28. See Luther L. McDougal III, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to
Euclidean Zoning, 47 TUL. L. REv. 255 (1973) (advocating the use of performance stan-
dards for mitigating land use impacts). McDougal acknowledges that ad hoc decisions
are not acceptable: "The opposite of a detailed plan, ad hoc administrative approval or
disapproval of each proposed land use, would permit administrative consideration of all
the changing factors in the community. But even assuming judicial approval of such an
alternative, which is extremely doubtful, this alternative appears to be the antithesis of
planning and therefore unacceptable." Id. at 265-66.
29. TEx. Loc. GoVT CODE ANN. § 211.004 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989,
1997); see also STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT, supra note 16, at § 3.
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ests, Houston acts unconstitutionally.3" Consider, for example, the ordi-
nance prohibiting front-yard parking in self-selecting districts. "31
Prohibitions against front-yard parking are not unusual, but ordi-
nary zoning prohibitions are pre-planned and imposed within rationally
drawn land use districts. The Houston solution does not pre-plan and
tailor regulations for specific districts. Instead, it delegates power to
homeowner associations, civic clubs, or 60% of owners in any neighbor-
hood to initiate a planning commission recommendation to the gov-
erning body to prohibit front-yard parking in the target district by
ordinance.3 2 If the governing body automatically validates the private
preferences, the procedure blatantly employs government power for pri-
vate purpose, no matter how sensible the decisions may be as a matter of
land use policy. Regardless of whether sympathetic Texas courts would
declare Houston's delegation of power to private persons illegal, the pro-
cedure primarily benefits self-organizing neighborhoods with active civic
clubs.3 3 It is of little use to low-income neighborhoods where front-yard
parking and front-yard auto repairs are more likely to present a real
problem.
3 1
30. Washington v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928) (declaring unconstitutional an
ordinance permitting philanthropic home for children and aged within a residential dis-
trict only if two-thirds of property owners consent). A Westlaw search of ALLCASES on
April 10, 2010 for "un! w/10 delegat! w/5 legislat! w/5 power" produced 6,343 responses.
Although many cases discuss and distinguish the doctrine, the undoubted beginning
point is that government cannot lawfully or constitutionally delegate its police power to
legislate for the public good to private parties who employ it for their own arbitrary
purposes.
31. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES % 28-301-305 (2009).
32. If the governing body actually exercises independent judgment and makes a
decision on the basis of a record made before the city council, then the delegation of
power is less blatant. If, however, the council hearing is a sham, then it appears to be a
pure delegation of arbitrary power authorizing private parties to infringe their neighbors'
property rights.
33. See, e.g., Sheretta R. Edwards, Residents Claim Third Ward Not for Sale,
World Internet News, April 15, 2004, available at http://soc.hfac.uh.edu/artman/publish/
article_87.shtml ("Residents of Houston's Third Ward say they fear unsympathetic urban
developers will succeed in taking over a community that holds a legacy of history and
fond memories for them. Signs that read 'Third Ward Is Our Home and It Is Not For
Sale' have been erected in many yards as a sign of residents' opposition to selling their
property. Developers have made unsolicited phone calls to Third Ward residents offering
to buy their homes. Residents say the townhomes developers want to build will cause
their taxes to go up, forcing the elderly and the poor out of the neighborhood.").
34. Third Ward Demographic Data, Point2Homes, http://homes.point2.com/
Neighborhood/US/Texas/Harris-County/Houston-Fort-Bend-County/Third-Ward-
Demographics.aspx (last visited June 12, 2010).
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5. Four Vignettes Reveal Outright Warfare and Unsettling Coziness
in the Unzoned City
So much for musing. How does Houston's cozy public-private sys-
tem play out in reality? Here are four vignettes that illustrate how Hous-
ton handles land use warfare while maintaining the facade that
impersonal, efficient private markets determine land use in a city of
happy homeowners.
The first vignette relates to traditional zoning regulation of the
"height, number of stories, and size of buildings. ' 35 The second describes
Houston's unorthodox way of implementing zoning's stated goal of
"preventing overcrowding. ' 36 The third illustrates real estate interests'
fear of traditional zoning, even on a small, neighborhood scale. The
fourth vignette highlights the intertwining of public and private interests
that prompted the city to use its power of eminent domain to subsidize
profit-seeking developers in direct violation of state statutory limitations.
II. THE ASHBY HIGH-RISE-A "TOWER OF TRAFFIC"
Ashby Street runs lazily through an elite residential Houston subdi-
vision, then abruptly intersects Bissonnet, a busy mixed-use street that
runs east and west. Bissonnet provides wide lanes for two-way traffic; it
could accommodate three, but it is not wide enough for four. Light com-
mercial uses, garden apartments, and single-family houses mingle peace-
fully on both sides of the street, separating two wealthy, restricted
residential areas-Southampton and Boulevard Oaks. Both subdivisions
butt up to opposite backsides of Bissonnet block fronts near the Ashby
intersection.
A. Public Power and "Private" Deed Restrictions Keep Commercial Uses
out of Residential Neighborhoods
The residential restrictions along Ashby Street require some explain-
ing. Along with many other inner-city residential neighborhoods, the
Southampton subdivision was platted with traditional residential deed
restrictions set to expire after a specific time. Southampton residents are
understandably concerned about an unrestricted and uncertain future in
unzoned Houston.3 7 If Houston development were truly driven by eco-
nomic forces, a free market in land use would eagerly inject higher-den-
35. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.003(a)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
2003).
36. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev.
ed. 1926).
37. E-mail from Evalyn Krudy, Executive Director, Southampton Civic Club,
Inc., to author (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file with author) ("Southampton's restrictions were set
forth on 4/15/1923, and filed with the City of Houston on June 25, 1923, allows for a
one-time, 50-year extension. They will permanently expire on 4/15/2023 unless they are
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sity residential and commercial uses into these affluent neighborhoods
and destroy their single-family exclusiveness. A fair number of less afflu-
ent inner-city Houston neighborhoods have suffered that fate, and the
results are not pretty.
3 8
A traditionally zoned city would preserve high-income neighbor-
hoods by classifying them as single-family districts and prohibiting com-
mercial uses and apartments. But in a city that rejects zoning, residential
neighborhoods must rely on private deed restrictions to keep the market
at bay. Several nearby subdivisions faced expiration of their restrictions
after the 1962 zoning referendum failed,39 and nervous residents looked
for a way to preserve their single-family residential character. Ordinary
property law would make renewal difficult, if not impossible, by requir-
ing near unanimous approval by lot owners.
4 0
B. Legislation on Demand Has Diverted
Homeowner Pressure for Zoning
Houston maintains its facade of free enterprise by periodically run-
ning to the Texas legislature for rifle-shot solutions whenever zoning
raises its ugly head or affluence needs tending to. Accordingly, in 1965, a
responsive legislature empowered Houston residents to renew residential
restrictions by a majority vote of lot owners.4 1 The renewal would apply
to all lots whose owners failed to "opt out" within one year after the
effective date.4 2 Southampton was not involved in statutory renewal
because its original restrictions allowed a one-time, 50-year renewal,
which happened in 1973. Its renewed restrictions expire in 2023, and
efforts are already underway to invoke the statutory renewal proce-
renewed or extended (in original or amended form) through CH 201 or 204 of the
TXRPC.").
38. See, e.g., supra notes 8 and 33 and accompanying text.
39. Kapur, supra note 2, at 10049-50.
40. See Williams v. Smith, 409 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 422 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1967); Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civic League,
696 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. App. 1985); Farmer v. Thompson, 289 S.W.2d 351, 355
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
41. Kapur, supra note 2, at 10050-52. The original act was TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 97 4 a-1 (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1965), which was repealed in 1987. TEx. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 97 4a- 1 (Supp. 2009). Most of that law was later codified at TEx.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 201.001-201.013 (Vernon 2007 & Supp. 2009).
42. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 201.009 (Vernon 2007); Kapur, supra note 2, at
10050 n.67.
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dures.4 3 Other residential areas near the Ashby-Bissonnet intersection
remain largely protected by original or renewed restrictions.
44
C. The City Attorney's Office Enforces Deed Restrictions
To add punch to private deed restrictions, the city attorney can sue
to enjoin violations,4 5 and the city requires applicants for building per-
mits to certify that proposed construction will not violate residential
restrictions.46 The resulting system looks and works a great deal like zon-
ing by a different name within the boundaries of restricted subdivisions.
With intact and enforceable restrictions, affluent residents near the inter-
section of Bissonnet and Ashby could feel reasonably safe from unwel-
come commercialism, but they knew the unrestricted land along the busy
street itself posed an obvious and constant development threat.
D. Development at the Fringe of Restricted Subdivisions Highlights
Weakness of Non-Zoning
The threat became imminent a few years ago, when Buckhead
Investment Partners bought a sixty-seven unit garden apartment project
at the intersection of Ashby and Bissonnet to develop a mixed-use project
featuring a twenty-three-story condominium.4 7 While not especially wel-
come, the aging garden apartments had not been a bad neighbor. A high-
43. See Sarah Kortemeier, Southampton Deed Restrictions Ending; Civic Club Hopes
to Establish New Ones, Village News, Nov. 27, 2007, available at http://www.buckfund.
com/docs/press-archive/Village%20News%2011-27-07.pdf (describing the earlier and
current renewal efforts).
44. Boulevard Oaks is not a single, restricted subdivision. There are instead a
number of subdivisions with different restrictions and different expiration dates. See
Deed Restrictions of Boulevard Oaks Civic Association, http://www.daveshine.org/
BOCADeedRestr/BOCADeedRestrictions.htm (last visited on May 25, 2010) (showing
some of the subdivisions restrictions and renewals). The city's planning department now
offers technical assistance for areas that want to use the statutory process to impose or
renew residential deed restrictions. See City of Houston Deed Restrictions Department,
http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/ComPlanning/deedrestr.htm (last visited May 25,
2010).
45. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.153 (Vernon 2010). See also Lewyn,
supra note 10, at 1204 ("If the city stopped subsidizing covenant enforcement, Houstoni-
ans would be less likely to enforce covenants that zone neighborhoods for just one possi-
ble form of use, thus increasing the number of mixed-use neighborhoods in which
residents can walk to shops and jobs.").
46. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINtANCES § 10-552, 10-555 (2010) (impos-
ing the permit requirement). To view the permit notice, see CITY OF HOUSTON, DEED
RESTRICTION COMPLIANCE NOTICE (June 15, 2004), available at http://documents.pub-
licworks.houstontx.gov/documents/divisions/planning/enforcement/deedcompliance.pdf.
See also TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.156 (Vernon 2010) (authorizing enforce-
ment of restrictions by ordinance).
47. Mike Snyder, City OKs Plans for Ashby High-Rise: Apartment Number Reduced,
but the Height Remains the Same; Ashy: Opponents Vow to Continue Fighting, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 22, 2009, at Al [hereinafter Snyder, City Oks Plans].
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rise tower was something else.48 Condominium owners would undoubt-
edly have been as affluent as many of the single-family residential owners,
but that wasn't the point. An often-heard complaint is that condomin-
ium owners could look into homeowners' backyards, and God knows
what they might see. In words reminiscent of the Zoning Enabling Act,
the tower's shadow would rob residents of light and air (which might be
a blessing, considering Houston's heat and pollution).4 9 Even more irri-
tating, the developers had been raised in the elite neighborhood.5" More
than one fuming resident asked why Buckhead (or a vulgarization of the
name) didn't build the tacky high-rise in somebody else's back yard.5 '
If free enterprise actually determined Houston land uses, the upscale
development would have quickly added fancy housing, a spa, shopping
facilities, and executive offices on the unzoned, unrestricted tract. Admit-
tedly, no zoned city would allow such a dramatic height departure from
surrounding low-rise residential uses. But Houston was supposed to be
different, and homeowners suddenly had to deal with that difference.
Without zoning to provide a conventional forum to respond to their
complaints, residential landowners began a visual and verbal rebellion.
Yellow signs opposing the "Tower of Traffic" sprouted on virtually every
yard within a mile of the Ashby site. Sympathetic homeowners located
far away joined the yard sign brigade.
52
E. Without Zoning, the City Responds to Citizen
Complaints in Ad Hoc, Arbitrary Ways
It was clear that Houston's city government had to respond-but
how? Houston routinely accepts whatever land use atrocities middling
and major developers inflict on less powerful neighborhoods, but com-
plaints by rich and powerful homeowners had to be attended to.5 The
fact that many of the outraged residents had voted against zoning in the
48. Id. ("'It's out of place for the neighborhood,' said Leslie Miller, who lives in a
townhouse next to the site.").
49. TEx. Loc. GOV'T COCDE ANN. § 211. 0 04(a) (Vernon 2010) ("Zoning Regula-
tions must be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan and must be designed to:
(4) provide adequate light and air; (5) prevent the overcrowding of land .... ).
50. Telephone Interview with Mike Snyder, Journalist, Houston Chronicle, in
Houston, Tex. (Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Snyder Telephone Interview].
51. Id
52. The author lives in West University Place, a separately incorporated and fully
zoned city a mile or so from the proposed construction site. A few sympathetic signs
appeared in West University Place during the height of the controversy. A number of
signs remain within a half mile of the controversial site. A search for signs on May 30,
2010, six months after the city's final refusal, located a protest sign at 2323 Dunstan, 0.8
miles from the proposed site, 1717 Bissonnet Street, according to Google Maps.
53. See Snyder, City Oks Plans, supra note 40 ("Mayor Bill White visited the site
and told neighbors in November 2007 that the city would use 'any appropriate power
under law' to block the project as proposed.").
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last referendum (or did not bother to vote) did not temper their rage at
this unwelcome "tower of traffic."54
The Ashby high-rise posed a real problem for the zoning-shy,
elected governing body. After quickly siding with homeowners, elected
officials looked for a way to use government power to stop the project. It
was hard to find. They used various strategies to delay the permit for two
years,55 but the developers' persistence finally reduced the city to its last
shot-a 1940 ordinance giving the public works director power to regu-
late driveways that intersect with city streets.
56
F. Traffic as a Control Device Slows
Down a Contested Project
The Ashby project would require driveway access to Bissonnet and/
or Ashby.5 1 Without Public Works' approval, there would be no permit
and no driveway. If, in the opinion of the director, the proposed develop-
ment generated more traffic than Bissonnet's two lanes could handle, the
department could refuse the permit. 58 The developer provided traffic
54. See Kapur, supra note 2, at 10059 (noting that of the 34.5% of upper-income
Anglo voters who turned out to vote, only 43.8% supported zoning).
55. The developers applied ten times for permits, and got final approval on their
eleventh attempt for a scaled-down project applied for under protest. For a copy of the
developer's petition, see Stop the Ashby High Rise, http://stopashbyhighrise.org/site/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/plaintiffsoriginalpetition2-11-10.pdf (last visited June 19,
2010).
56. Carolyn Feibel, High-Rise Would Fail New City Standards, Hous. CHRON.,
Feb. 27, 2008, at B1 ("The driveway law dates back to 1940, though its current form
began to take shape in 1968. [Mayor] White acknowledged that reviving this broadly
worded law might have a 'chilling' effect on growth, so he circulated a memo Wednesday
with criteria on how it would be applied. The memo said that developments that meet
three criteria will receive 'more intense scrutiny' of their traffic loads. The criteria are: [1]
A location where 60% or more of the properties within a 500-foot radius are residential[;]
[2] Driveways that feed onto local or collector streets instead of a major thoroughfare[;]
[31 A net increase of 50 additional vehicles going to and from the development during
rush hours."). See also HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES % 45-365-376 (2010)
(listing process for review of traffic ramifications).
57. The City Planning Commission administers HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 42-22 (2010), which requires a development plat for new construction
outside the central business district, except for single-family residential use. The pro-
posed development apparently met the requirements for approval under this section.
58. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 40-86 (c)(5) (2010) (requiring a
permit for driveways connecting private streets with public streets, and requires refusal of
applications "[ifl the proposed use of the driveway would create an extraordinary traffic
hazard or would excessively interfere with the normal use of the street right-of-way").
There is a serious procedural due process question whether the director makes a decision
on driveway permits on the basis of standards adopted before the decision. The author
attended the board of adjustment hearing on the developer's appeal of permit denial, and
the city attorney justified the director's decision as his "professional opinion" as to traffic
impact. As viewed by a bystander, it is as likely that the director's decision was prompted
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studies. Alas, traffic flowing from a condominium, even a high-rise con-
dominium, is not substantial.
Inasmuch as sixty-seven units would be demolished to make way for
the new housing, traffic enhancement would not start from zero. In the
director's opinion, it was the proposed commercial uses that would cause
a traffic jam. Under protest, the developer applied for a permit for a
reduced project without the spa, retail space, and executive offices, and
with residential units reduced from 226 to 210.'9 The director approved
the driveway for this reduced permit. Undeterred, angry homeowners
scheduled a meeting to look for other ways to bludgeon the "tower of
traffic" into submission.6 °
The developer appealed the denial of a permit for the full project to
the General Appeals Board, a city panel composed mostly of city employ-
ees, which affirmed denial of the permit. The city has made its final
denial, and the developer has sued for $42 million, allegin violation of
constitutional rights. 61 The drama will continue well after this article is
published.
What is abundantly clear from the Ashby dispute is that the city
used its formal power to withhold driveway permits as leverage to impose
zoning-type limits on development. The driveway procedure operates
without clear standards, and the application of the driveway ordinance to
control use may be unprecedented in local practice.
G. City Politicians Dare Not Whisper the Z Word
Even in the middle of a city election last fall, no mayoral candidate
mentioned that conventional land use zoning would have protected the
neighborhood and saved the developer from assuming that Houston is a
free enterprise city. As the city's primary newspaper described, one candi-
date advocated "develop[ing] a citywide deed restriction database [and]
creat[ing] [an] 'ultra-urban' development code category for neighbor-
hoods such as Midtown." Another wanted to "[s]implify [the] develop-
ment code to make it 'business friendly' [and] enable planned
development districts where property owners and developers could create
by political objection to the project voiced by the mayor as by considerations of traffic
congestion.
59. Snyder Telephone Interview, supra note 42.
60. The neighborhood blog opposing the Ashby development, Stop the Ashby
High Rise, reported on April 13, 2010, that the developers have filed a $42 million suit
against the city, and states the neighborhood's continuing opposition. Stop the Ashby
High Rise, http://www.stopashbyhighrise.org (last visited June 19, 2010) ("We will mon-
itor this litigation and keep you informed. We will also be evaluating our options with
respect to participating in the suit.") The blog also reproduces the yard signs that still
stand throughout the subdivision.
61. See Mike Snyder, Ashby Developers Push for Original Plan, Hous. CHRON.,
Oct. 21, 2009, at B2.
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their own codes." And a third candidate said "city neighborhoods should
be made competitive with suburban ones and 'edge development'
[should be] encouraged in underdeveloped areas." Finally, the fourth
said, "[slupport property rights; continue to provide choice of deed-
restricted and unrestricted neighborhoods." None of the four major may-
oral candidates supported zoning. 2
The Ashby controversy highlights the efforts of Houston residential
neighborhoods to accomplish traditional zoning's separation of conflict-
ing land uses, and the inability of the city to respond in a traditional and
legal way. A related land use aim recited in the enabling act is to "prevent
overcrowding.63
III. PARTY-WALL DUPLEXES ALLOWED BY DEED RESTRICTIONS CAN
BE PROHIBITED BY NEIGHBORS' OBJECTION
Southampton Extension is a south-of-Bissonnet subdivision about a
mile west of the Ashby high-rise site. Like adjacent Southampton, the
Extension was developed as a restricted, low-density residential commu-
nity. Unlike their across-the-street Southampton neighbors, the less
restrictive Extension's restrictions allowed duplexes. Expectations in the
1930s were that an owner might build a duplex, live in one unit, and
rent out the other. Over time, the Extension became trendy, and some
duplexes were converted to single-family structures or replaced by large
new houses. 64 But the exception for duplexes remained and opened the
door for a more profitable type of dwelling-two separately owned resi-
dences joined by a party wall, with separate fee ownership of a split lot.
65
Splitting a platted lot into two separately owned parcels produces a "re-
plat" that requires City Planning Commission approval.66
62. Mike Snyder, Mayoral Race: A Plan to Guide the Way the City Grows; Candi-
dates Differ on New Development in Unzoned Houston; Mayor: No Top Candidate Backs
Zoning Laws in City, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2009, at BI. See also infa note 95 and
accompanying text.
63. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 211.004(a) (Vernon 2010) ("Zoning regula-
tions must be... designed to: ... (5) prevent the overcrowding of land; (6) avoid undue
concentration of population ... "). What this means in practice is that local govern-
ments employ zoning to maintain the character and value in predominately affluent sub-
divisions by prohibiting construction on lots that are smaller than the area's norm.
Imposing minimum lot sizes in a zoned city or in Houston increases urban sprawl by
prohibiting higher density. One might think that Houston's purported reliance on eco-
nomic forces would free developers to convert inner-city land to higher density to accom-
modate demand for row houses or zero-lot-line residences. But that has not turned out to
be the case, as the next vignette illustrates.
64. The author has lived in or near the described area for more than 30 years and
makes this observation from first-hand experience.
65. As full disclosure, the author bought one such unit on a split lot in 1980 and
sold it to good friends in 1984. The new owners broke through the party wall and
turned the two units into a large single-family residence.
66. TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 212.004 (Vernon 2010).
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A. Lot Splitting Requires City Planning Commission
Approval as a Re-Plat
7
If the lot split satisfies local regulations and does not affect restric-
tions, Texas Local Government Code authorizes the planning commis-
sion to approve a re-plat after a public hearing.6 8 If considered as a
contested variance, approval must receive a three-fourths vote of the
commission.6
9
67. The Planning Department (an administrative department, not the Planning
Commission) forthrightly declares in its web site that the Department "[r]egulates land
development in Houston and the extra territorial jurisdiction." City of Houston Plan-
ning and Development Department, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/AboutPD/Abt
Planning.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
68. TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 212.004, 212.014, 212.0146, 212.015
(Vernon 2010); HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 42-49 (2010) (requiring
notice to property owners within 200 feet of a proposed re-plat and a public hearing
before action by the Planning Commission).
69. The planning commission is "a 26-member board appointed by the Mayor
and confirmed by City Council[, and] includes citizens, elected officials and the Director
of Planning and Development. The Commission reviews and approves subdivision and
development plats. The Commission also studies and makes recommendations to City
Council on development issues in Houston." City of Houston, Houston Planning Com-
mission: About the Commission, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/PlanningCommis-
sion/plan.htm (last visited June 19, 2010).
It is not clear what standard the Planning Commission does apply or should apply
when reviewing a re-plat application.
There are two logical beginning points: (1) The re-plat would be denied absent
undue hardship; or (2) The lot owner has a property right to split the lot unless it creates
a problem that justifies denial. In a zoning context, the first approach resembles a vari-
ance; the second a special exception. See W. Texas Water Refiners v. S & B Beverage Co.,
915 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App. 1996) (recognizing the distinction).
One might argue that approved subdivision plats create expectations of stability,
particularly in urban residential areas. Re-plats may therefore reasonably be viewed as
departures from the desirable and approved condition, justifying rejection unless special
circumstances show undue hardship. An applicant for a split lot in Southampton Exten-
sion would have to apply for a variance, give notice to neighbors, and present evidence at
a hearing. But evidence of what?
It is rare that an applicant who wants to split a platted lot could show undue hard-
ship if the lot is like every other lot in the subdivision, and the owner can realize full value
by building a single house. The only hardship is that the developer would make more
money from selling two units. This would not justify a variance by ordinary zoning
principles or by the standards in the Houston ordinance.
The alternative approach is that, if the re-plat conforms to all other city regulations,
then lot splitting is a matter of right, and the application should be systematically
approved unless circumstances present some unusual problem. If this analysis is accepted,
then the rules for special exception, not variances, would logically apply, and the burden
should be on opponents of the particular split to show some sort of special harm to the
neighborhood resulting from the re-plat.
Houston's special exception provisions are confusingly crafted in variance terms, so
it is not clear what logic applies.
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Although the split-lot dwellings were expensive and architectural, a
number of Extension residents did not welcome half-sized houses joined
at the hip on half-sized lots, and they looked for a way to stop the infill
development.7" If their city were zoned, the entire subdivision might
have been originally classified for single-family residential use, with
existing duplexes continuing as nonconforming uses. Even if initially
zoned to allow duplexes, a district-wide zoning amendment could accom-
modate the residents' desire to exclude them. But in unzoned Houston,
the offended residents lacked access to traditional remedies. What to do?
B. Lot Owners Can Invoke a Minimum Lot Size Ordinance to Prevent
Lot Splitting
The city's response to unwanted lot splitting is typical of The Hous-
ton Way. A city ordinance authorizes a majority of lot owners to initiate
minimum lot size regulations block by block.7 1 Any lot owner can peti-
tion the city planning director for a minimum lot size to apply within
that owner's block face (or to opposing blackfaces in the same block). The
director must approve and send the application directly to the city coun-
cil for legislative approval if owner(s) of 51% of the lots in the block
agree and no lot owner objects. If an objection is filed, the entire plan-
ning commission conducts a hearing and, if it so decides, sends to the
city council a minimum lot size ordinance applying just to that block.
Planning Commission approval appears to be automatically keyed to the
same 51% vote.72 The minimum lot size is awkwardly, but precisely,
calculated as "the largest existing size that lots in 70% of the area ... in
the special minimum lot size area are equal to or greater than."' 73 The
average split lot in the Extension could not come close to meeting this
requirement.
70. For an example of a resolution of such a dispute, see infra note 74. The author
submitted an opinion opposing the particular application of the ordinance as illegal and
unconstitutional.
71. HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-194 (2010). The ordinance is
remarkably similar to that considered in Longley v. Rumsey. 224 N.Y.S. at 166 ("The
ordinance in question does not divide the village into geographical subdivisions, but, in
lieu thereof, attempts to establish, as a separate district in itself, each village block; that is,
two sides of one street between the nearest intersections. Whether or not each of those
districts is residential or otherwise depends, not upon the decision of the trustees, but
upon the number of residences and vacant lots found within that so-called district....
Because of the failure of this ordinance to deal with the matter in accordance with a
comprehensive plan, and because of the arbitrary method by which the character of the
so-called districts is determined, it follows that this ordinance is not a valid restriction
upon the use of the premises ....").
72. HOUSTON, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-194 (1999) (describing the
procedure.
73. HOUSTON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4 2 -194(e) (2010).
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If a lot owner in the Extension proposes to split a lot, the applica-
tion triggers formal notice to the neighbors who can quickly respond
with a request for a minimum lot size ordinance to apply within the
block. If successful, the lot owners can disable splits in their entire block
for twenty years. Only a developer who has acquired 51% of lots in an
entire block face can fend off the neighbors and build on split lots. No
surprise there.
C. Houston's Minimum Lot Size Ordinance is a
Land Use Law Disaster
The minimum lot size ordinance effectively empowers 51% of pri-
vate lot owners in a block to initiate a process that arbitrarily destroys
their neighbors' traditional property rights.7 With application limited to
a single block, the ordinance creates tiny land use districts without any
rational connection to comprehensive planning. Minimum lot size adds
to urban sprawl by preventing higher density infill. The procedure injects
the legislative body into what is essentially an adjudicative, individualized
imposition of regulations.7 5 An apt zoning analogy is illegal spot zoning
that singles out an individual tract for advantageous or disadvantageous
treatment.
76
Substantive due process is offended by a delegation of arbitrary
power to neighbors to use government power to advance private prefer-
ences,77 not public purposes.78 Procedural due process is implicated by
74. See Appolo Development, Inc. v. City of Garland, 476 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972) (holding that the Zoning Enabling Act, which empowered cities to regulate
use of property within their boundaries, and set out procedures therefore and for enforce-
ment of relevant ordinances, had to be complied with in detail and rigidly performed;
compliance was necessary for the validity of all zoning ordinances, whether amendatory,
temporary, or emergency).
75. Jim Guidry & Garrett Bryce, Houston City Council, GUIDRYNEWs.coM, Apr.
29, 2009, available at http://www.guidrynews.com/story.aspx?id=1000017303 ("The city
council voted 11-1 ... to approve an ordinance establishing the north and south sides of
the 2300 block of Albans Road as a special minimum lot size area.").
76. The spot zoning doctrine is alive and well in Texas. See City of Pharr v. Tip-
pitt, 616 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1981) (attempting to spell out objective criteria for spot
zoning); Bernard v. City of Bedford, 593 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (clearly
defining "spot zoning" as "zoning a particular tract of land differently from the surround-
ing area without regard to a plan or design or without justification," which is a void use
of zoning).
77. See Kapur, supra note 2, at 10056 n.159; Kenneth B. Bley, Use of the Civil
Rights Acts to Recover Damages in Land Use Cases (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 12-14,
2007) WL SM040 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 207, 263 ("Denying or revoking a land use approval
merely because neighbors object to a project is a violation of substantive due process.");
see generally FM Properties v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 874 (2000) (listing eight
factors in determining whether a delegation to private parties is legal in Texas); compare
Guidry & Bryce, supra note 75 ("Council member.., noted that most members of the
neighborhood support the new lot size restriction."), with Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1981) (declaring delegation of veto power to churches located within 500 feet
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the adjudicative nature of the minimum lot size decision, 79 and any pro-
cedural shortcoming contaminates the governing body's decision." The
city council is supposed to legislate, not apply regulations to specific situ-
ations. 8' Undertaking an adjudicative role even makes individual council
members vulnerable to civil rights suits in their personal capacity, along
with the city.82Legislative bodies are entirely political, and they are not
accustomed to acting in an adjudicative role that requires at least mini-
mal procedural due process. The only supporting analogy from zoning
law is the questionable specific-use permit, whereby the governing body
of a liquor licensee application unconstitutional), and State of Washington v. Roberge,
278 U.S. 116 (1928) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance permitting philanthropic
home for children and aged within a residential district only if two-thirds of property
owners consent). The minimum lot size ordinance seems to flunk most of the listed
standards. In particular, FMProperties points out that landowners have a pecuniary inter-
est that may conflict with their public function-a factor clearly at work in the minimum
lot size petition. FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 877. The only legitimatization would come
from a pattern of serious consideration by the legislative body itself. If it acts as a rubber
stamp, then the delegation grants effective power to the 51% of lot owners in a block.
78. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d at 176-77 (outlining four legal criteria or standards for
review of zoning ordinances, including that "[t[he amendatory ordinance must bear a
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare or protect
and preserve historical and cultural places and areas").
79. See Developments in the Law: Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427 (1978), for an
influential and prescient discussion of the difference between legislative actions that apply
generally, and adjudicative actions that apply to specific situations. Fasano v. Board of
County Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973), boldly applied the distinction to place a
heightened review standard on zoning amendments. However, Fasano's popularity
diminished as complications and criticism emerged. The distinction itself remains, how-
ever, as illustrated by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
80. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 ("The sort of land use regulations discussed in the
cases just cited, however, differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. First,
they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,
whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application
for a building permit on an individual parcel."). See also Bley, supra note 77, at 275
("Procedural due process requires a hearing .... "); id. at 276 ("Allowing revocation of a
permit through the referendum process violates the right to procedural due process.").
81. City of West University Place v. Ellis, 134 S.W.2d 1038 (1940). See also Bley,
supra note 77. The most dramatic application of the difference between legislative and
adjudicative action is described in Fasano, 507 P.2d at 23 (classifying zoning amendment
as quasi-adjudicative, not legislative).
82. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), applied a functional test for deter-
mining whether an act is legislative, judicial, or administrative. Bley, supra note 77, at
273-74 ("Procedural due process generally requires notice and hearing before an individ-
ual landowner is deprived of property through administrative action .... Legislative acts
do not require notice or hearings .... A legislature cannot deprive a landowner of due
process rights associated with administrative actions merely by declaring them to be legis-
lative .... However, even acts which are normally legislative may be held to require notice
and hearing when they are aimed at only one piece of land."); id. at 350 ("Local legisla-
tive officials acting in an administrative or executive capacity have only a qualified
immunity.").
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approves special exceptions that should be administered by the Board of
Adjustment. 3
Having the governing body act adjudicatively is less disturbing than
Houston's growing practice of delegating effective legislative power to
private lot owners to restrict their neighbors' ordinary property rights.
But that is The Houston Way.
The next vignette illustrates the total antipathy of development
interests to anything called zoning.
IV. THE THWARTED NEIGHBORHOOD ZONING BILL
Traditional zoning could provide a simple and direct resolution for
the Ashby controversy and lot splitting in Southampton Extension. Zon-
ing regulations need not even apply city-wide to serve this function.
Some twenty years ago, a proposal was made to empower the governing
body to identify districts within the city and employ traditional zoning
regulations within those districts, but not city-wide. The entire proceed-
ing would be carried out "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
both as to the entire city and within the land use districts themselves.84
The neighborhood zoning proposal was shelved in favor of city-
wide zoning, which seemed a cinch to pass in 1993, but nevertheless
failed the referendum.8 5 The concept of neighborhood zoning was
revived in 2009, partly-but not entirely-as a result of the Ashby high-
rise controversy. House Bill 4648 would have authorized less-than-city-
wide zoning in complying neighborhoods, euphemistically titled "man-
agement districts."86 The less-than-city-wide zoning proposal had some
local precedent. Houston now hosts several Tax Increment Reinvestment
Zones with traditional land use zoning power granted by specific ena-
bling statutes, though most do not exercise the power.87 The special zon-
ing bill was introduced on the last day for new legislation with some
chance it would slip through without the anti-zoning lobby noticing it.
83. This procedure was approved by City of Lubbock v. Whitacre, 414 S.W.2d
497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
84. John Mixon, Neighborhood Zoning in Houston, 31 S. TEx. L. REv. 1 (1990).
85. Kapur, supra note 2, at 10059.
86. H.B. 4648, 81st Sess., at 1 (Tex. 2009). The bill would apply only to "a
municipality the majority of the population of which is located in a county with a popu-
lation of more than three million," id. at 1, i.e., Houston. It provided for residential
management districts to be created on petition by more than 60% of the owners of land
within the proposed district, and required the municipality to create a Residential Man-
agement District if the conditions were met. Id. at 2. It authorized "establishment of
land use regulations to the extent authorized by Texas law, subject to approval by the
municipality." Id. at 3.
87. Kapur, supra note 2, at 10055.
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A. Support from an Unexpected Constituency
This legislative effort was different from previous zoning attempts,
in that a legislator from a predominately African American and Hispanic
district sponsored it."8 Zoning referenda in Houston traditionally receive
an overwhelmingly negative vote from low-income voters in minority
districts.89 It is rumored that money to defeat the 1993 referendum was
passed by owners of sexually oriented businesses to minority ministers
who preached against "white man's zoning." The sexually oriented busi-
nesses, although already regulated as to distance and location,9" appar-
ently feared even tighter control through zoning. What has happened
since 1993 to make zoning a more attractive option to minorities?
There may be several answers. First, Houston has some very upscale
minority neighborhoods. They have the same problems, and perhaps the
same political power, as wealthy white neighborhoods. 91 It is low-income
residents of every ethnicity who are most adversely affected by the city's
squeaky wheel attitude toward land use control. They do not have access
to power, and they live next to the worst uses. 92 No local government is
interested in controlling industrial polluters that belch waste onto nearby
minority residential areas.93 Minority neighborhoods harbor some of the
worst land use offenders, such as "hot sheet" motels, liquor stores, canti-
nas, trashy front-yard businesses, and most recently, blockbusting devel-
opers who destroy traditional African American neighborhoods by
gentrifying any land standing in the path of white residential expansion.
88. Garnet Coleman, sponsor of the bill, represents Houston's 147th district,
which is almost 50% African American. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DISTRICT POPU-
LATION ANALYSIS WITH COUNTY SU3TOTALS (2008), http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/
fyiwebdocs/PDF/house/distl 47/r4.pdf.
89. Kapur, supra note 2, at 10060-61.
90. 7 TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 243.001 (Vernon 2010).
91. See Jon Schwartz, This Is Our Home It Is Not for Sale: Synopsis, http://thisis
ourhomeitisnotforsale.com (last visited June 19, 2010) ("Riverside emerged as one of the
leading minority communities in the U.S. For upwardly mobile blacks who had found
the good life here, their status quo was threatened by: 1) the expansion of two universities
into the area; 2) the construction of a freeway displacing the western edge of the neigh-
borhood; 3) the placement of a county psychiatric hospital within the neighborhood; and
4) the reappearance of white home buyers into the area.") See also Kapur, supra note 2, at
10059 (showing that 62.6% of middle-income African American voters supported zoning
in the 1993 referendum, whereas fewer than 28% of low-income African Americans sup-
ported zoning in that referendum).
92. See id. at 10060 ("Planning and Zoning Commission Chairman Marvin Katz
observed: 'The black and Hispanic leaders in the community are the people who call me
most frequently to say they want a zoning ordinance ... .' Pastor Ed Lockett, a minister
in a minority community.., asserted that zoning would benefit low-income homeown-
ers by protecting the residential character of their neighborhoods.") (citing Karen Wein-
traub, Black Leaders Among Supporters of Zoning, Hous. POST, Feb. 10, 1993, at Al).
93. Sprol, Worst Place in the World: Shipping Through East Houston, http://
www.sprol.com/2005/07/shipping-through-east-houston (last visited June 19, 2010
(describing environmental pollution that primarily affects low-income areas).
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Low-income homeowners do not often have active civic associations with
political power, such as the "stop Ashby" movement. Could it be that
real estate interests can no longer count on manipulating the minority
vote in another zoning referendum? That question is not likely to be
answered in the near future.
B. The Real Estate Lobby Ambushed Neighborhood Zoning
The effort to enact the neighborhood zoning bill failed when the
real estate lobby discovered it and killed it.94 Candidates in the recent
mayoral race disowned the proposal, along with zoning of all kinds, and
their campaigns offered only platitudinous commitment to "smart"
codes, "neighborhood preservation" and more police. 9 5 The successful
candidate, current mayor Annise Parker, has said she does "not believe
that zoning is workable for Houston."96 Business as usual prevails in
Houston land use politics, despite the narrow defeat of zoning in 1993
and apparently increased support today.
The next vignette illustrates the hypocrisy that passes for gospel in
the church of public-private religion.
V. EMINENT DOMAIN IS AVAILABLE ON DEMAND
(FOR THE RIGHT PEOPLE)
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London97 gen-
erated party-line Republican and Libertarian outrage against local gov-
ernments using eminent domain to acquire land for economic
development.9 8 The liberal members of the Court had to convince Jus-
tice Kennedy to concur that the Fifth Amendment's "public use" require-
94. See E-mail from a Southampton advocate for the bill (May 18, 2009) (on file
with author) ("I'm afraid that House Bill 4648 is dead for this session. We were on track
with a submarine proposal that was headed for the House local and uncontested docket.
However, the anti-zoning development lobby finally did discover the bill, and its progress
promptly stopped.").
95. Mike Snyder, Houston Politics Blog, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sketching an
Urban Blueprint (Sept. 9, 2009), http://blogs.chron.com/houstonpolitics/2009/09/
sketching-an-urban-blueprint.html ("'Smart development' sounds a lot like 'smart
growth,' an approach to metropolitan development that supports compact, intercon-
nected neighborhoods and seeks to limit suburban sprawl .... In past interviews . . . [a
mayoral candidate] has said he believes Houston should adopt a form-based development
code, which doesn't segregate land uses as conventional 'Euclidian' zoning does (commer-
cial, residential etc.) [sic] but regulates based on buildings' shape and size in the context
of their surroundings.").
96. Press Release, Annise Parker, Statement by Annise Parker on the Ashby High
Rise (Aug. 22, 2009), available at http://stopashbyhighrise.org/?p=13
6 .
97. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
98. For a particularly virulent attack, see Gideon Kanner, "[UnlequalJustice Under
Law"' The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases,
40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1065 (2007).
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ment allowed the city of New London, Connecticut to take private land
that would eventually be conveyed to a private entity.99 The plurality
decision found the Fifth Amendment's "public purpose" satisfied by eco-
nomic improvement in the city.' 0 Justice O'Connor's dissent, by con-
trast, would have limited eminent domain to two circumstances: (1)
where true public use obtains (as with streets and parks); and (2) where
transfer of title to private entities alleviates a public harm, as opposed to
providing an economic benefit.101
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was more pointed. Although
he agreed that economic development satisfied the public purpose test,
he would prohibit all takings that "favor a particular private party, with
only incidental or pretextual public benefits .... 2
A. The Texas Legislature Enacted Kennedy's Concurring View
The 2005 Texas legislature picked up on Kennedy's warning against
pretextual takings and enacted a "Limitation on Eminent Domain for
Private Parties or Economic Development" statute, commanding that:
(b) A governmental or private entity may not take private property
through the use of eminent domain if the taking: (1) confers a
private benefit on a particular private party through the use of the
property; (2) is for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a
private benefit on a particular private party .. 1..03
B. But When a Private Developer Needs a Pretty Park,
Houston Obligingly Condemns the Land
Kelo would ordinarily be a non-issue in Houston, where eminent
domain is rarely used except for right-of-way acquisition. 104 Moreover,
Houston's supposed free market in land use would superficially translate
into a hands-off role for the city. But neither ideology nor statute stood
in the way of aggressive condemnation when a politically powerful real
estate developer wanted to dress up the front yard of his proposed
project.
99. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 484-85.
101. Id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In [Berman and Midkifl1 the
extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm
on society .... a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was eliminated.").
102. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (Vernon 2005).
104. Houston refused to participate in urban renewal and for the most part did
not use eminent domain to acquire land for public housing. Carolyn Feibel et al., Tiny
Bit of Land Triggers Big Fight Over City Powers: Case Centers on Whether Eminent Domain
Used on Developer's Behalf, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2008, at Al ("[The park director]
said he did not want to seize the land for the park and has never used condemnation to
create parkland in Houston during his four-and-a-half-year tenure.").
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The problem was a very visible palm reader who rented a poorly
maintained home from two brothers who owned a 0.16-acre lot as inves-
tors.'1 5 The brothers refused to sell at the developer's price.' 0 6 No doubt,
the splashy advertisement of fortunes for a fee would detract from a
multi-million-dollar, mixed-use, upscale, next-door development.1
0 7
Even worse, the offensive lot threatened to nix the sale of a residential
tower site that was expressly conditioned on dressing up the ugly tract.' 08
When the developer's private negotiations stalled, the city gracefully
stepped forward and condemned a portion of the lot to widen a public
street (an admittedly legitimate use), and the rest of the tiny tract for a
public park (not so legitimate).'0 9
The postage stamp park violates Houston's expressed policy against
park dedications smaller than one acre.'1 0 The speck of green at issue
here was purely surplus because a 4.7-acre park stands just two blocks
away."' The park director opposed condemnation and testified in a dep-
osition that he was simply handed an approving memo to sign-the first
time in his four-and-a-half-year tenure the city had acquired park land by
eminent domain." 2 The city's tender of $433,800 is far less than the
developer's last offer of $1.4 million, which the lot owners refused."
1 3
There could not be a better bargain for the developer, who did not even
have to use his own money for the "park."
The taking is probably constitutional under the liberal "public pur-
pose" test of Kelo ' majority opinion, and the tiny tract's ultimate use by
the public satisfies O'Connor's public use requirement. But it runs head-
on into Justice Kennedy's warning that eminent domain should not be
used for strictly private purposes-a prohibition that is restated in the
Texas statute.
Only true believers in The Houston Way would defend using city
funds to dress up the favored developer's front door. But this developer
serves on the board of the public management district that orchestrated
the acquisition, he contributed substantial sums to campaign funds of
105. The portion of the tract to be used as a park is .09 acres. The entire tract is
7230 square feet, which is approximately .16 acres. Id.
106. See Mike Snyder, Brothers Say City Hall Trying To Pull a Fast One: They Claim
Their Nest Egg Is Being Scrambled to Help Developer, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2008, at B 1
[hereinafter Snyder, Brothers]; Feibel et al., supra note 104.
107. Snyder, Brothers, supra note 106.
108. Feibel, supra note 104.
109. HousrON, TEx., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42-257 (2007) sets a minimum
of one acre for park dedication.
110. Id. ("Unless determined otherwise by the parks director pursuant to subsec-
tion (f) of section 42-252 of this Code, the minimum size of land dedicated for a park in
the urban area shall be one acre.").
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various elected officials, and specific council members have questionable
financial connections with the development entity. 14
City officials are undoubtedly proud of the successful "public-pri-
vate partnership" park that may indeed eventually benefit the city.
Whether the action was legal, corrupt, or a brazen disregard of statutory
and constitutional limits clearly does not count. It's The Houston Way.
VI. DISSECTING THE VIGNETTES
What do these vignettes indicate? First, that Houston may be
unique, but not in a way its boosters would like to project. Free enter-
prise drives land use only when it is politically palatable. Government
power is available for affluent homeowners and developers alike who have
access to city hall.
Second, enacting a formal and traditional zoning ordinance might
not make much difference in the city. The same real estate interests that
influence city government today would undoubtedly hold power over
city-wide municipal zoning. Without zoning, subdivision developers plan
large-scale subdivisions, fully aware the unzoned market requires deed
restrictions that automatically renew and may last long after their useful-
ness. At least in the short run, the virtually perpetual restrictions keep
interior residential lots safe from commercial intrusion in new subdivi-
sions. Houston has produced some pleasant and vibrant inner-city neigh-
borhoods that may fare better without traditional zoning, which might
have overregulated them. Older, affluent subdivisions that can swing the
vote to renew and revitalize their restrictions have a handy statutory
mechanism for preserving exclusivity. As a result, Houston's elite and
gentrifying neighborhoods may not need zoning, although, as Ashby
showed, they are vulnerable at the fringes.
Third, low-income areas are ignored, or at best viewed as gentrifica-
tion opportunities whenever a demand arises for upscale inner-city hous-
ing. Gentrification is regarded as a good thing by the city, by developers,
and by upwardly mobile seekers of new, close-in housing. It is a problem
only for the people and the neighborhoods that are displaced. The big-
gest land use problem is that low-income residents must suffer whatever
next-door uses the market provides while waiting for the poodles.1"5
Zoning could eliminate the worst offenders from low-income residential
114. Id. ("[The named developer] has given [the mayor] $10,000 in campaign
contributions since 2005, while [the apartment site purchaser] executives have donated at
least $21,000 to the mayor. [A councilman], whose wife is an investor in the BLVD
Place development, received at least $3,500 from [the developer] and $6,500 from [the
apartment site purchaser] executives during the same period.").
115. The reference is to a scene in the movie "Blow Up" showing a professional
photographer buying land in shaky areas when it began to have people walking poodles-
a sure sign of gentrification.
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areas. But worrying about these citizens' land use problems would not be
The Houston Way.
Houston lives in its own dream world of free enterprise, where real
estate interests cynically control city government (though less directly
than in the past), and where slogans prevail over substance. The antipa-
thy to zoning has become a fetish, not a substantive objection. In a zoned
city, the Ashby controversy would have been resolved in favor of the
neighborhoods. The residents lost in Houston because the city can only
respond in questionable, ad hoc, probably illegal, and arbitrary measures
that keep just enough peace to maintain the status quo. Ad hoc objection
failed to stop Ashby's scaled-down twenty-three story condominium.
Houston's land use problems run deeper than lack of zoning. They
invoke the fundamental ethical issue whether land use laws and city gov-
ernment should operate for the entire citizenry or just for the elite.
VII. FAINT PRAISE FOR THE HOUSTON WAY
It is easy to overestimate zoning as a tool for creating a planned
urban environment.1 16 At best, zoning may provide a process for keeping
the various interests in the city in some sort of equilibrium. The Zoning
Enabling Act's stated objectives, such as preventing overcrowding, cannot
withstand serious analysis in a world that is far different from that envi-
sioned when the Supreme Court justified zoning as an act of the police
power in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. by declaring that
the segregation of residential, business and industrial buildings
will make it easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the charac-
ter and intensity of the development in each section; that it will
increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tend to pre-
vent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic
and resulting confusion in residential sections, decrease noise and
other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders,
preserve a more favorable environment in which to rear children,
etc. With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed
out that the development of detached house sections is greatly
retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes
resulted in destroying the entire section for private house pur-
poses; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a
mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open
spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential char-
acter of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment
house is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk
with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the
116. McDougal, supra note 28, at 256 ("[W]hatever reasons underlie its failure,
the significant fact is that zoning has not been an effective land-use planning device.").
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sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises
incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by
means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of
the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving chil-
dren of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by
those in more favored localities-until, finally, the residential char-
acter of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of
detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circum-
stances, apartment houses, which in a different environment
would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable,
come very near to being nuisances.
11 7
Illegal and awkward though they are, Houston's haphazard proce-
dures provide mechanisms that keep homeowners (at least those who are
rich and organized enough to count) and developers from engaging in
even more drastic confrontation. The only villains are real estate opera-
tors who sacrifice homeowners' (and sometimes their own) best interests
to serve the ideological imperative of keeping Houston free from tradi-
tional zoning. The neighborhoods have legitimate needs, and they use
whatever devices, legal or not, that are available to them. City Planning
Commission members are decent, public-spirited citizens who carry out a
constant, probably unconstitutional delegation of new tasks. Could an
optimist find a pony anywhere in this mass of excrementum ex equus?11 8
Maybe.
The dominant pattern of Houston's land use regulations requires
self-identifying neighborhoods to organize themselves to advance and
protect a perceived common interest. These local interests are totally self-
ish, but the selfish residents are engaged in bloody warfare against
another selfish group of profit-seekers who would destroy everyone's per-
sonal and property values to make a buck. Deed restriction renewal,
front-yard parking prohibition, minimum lot size, and howling opposi-
tion to a high-rise are all based on the notion that people in a neighbor-
hood know what is best for them and their very local community.
Houston is so sprawling and discontinuous that neighborhoods are
hard to identify and identify with. The political process is so dominated
by real estate and business interests that there is no legitimate procedure
whereby homeowners can protect their greatest investment. Anything
117. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95.
118. Translation of "horse manure" into Latin is courtesy of a learned colleague,
Michael Olivas. The reference is to a story about two children, one of whom is an
extreme pessimist and the other an extreme optimist. On a gifting holiday, the parents
addressed the problem by giving the pessimist thousands of dollars worth of toys, while
giving the optimist nothing but a pile of horse manure. On seeing the toys, the pessimist
burst into tears, crying that the toys would soon break and bring sadness. But the opti-
mist joyfully shouted "with all this horse (manure), there has to be a pony somewhere."
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that identifies, protects, and reinforces community-that essential qual-
ity of human existence-is useful in a sprawling urban amoeba such as
Houston. But few, if any, Houston practices are worth exporting to other
cities.

